I. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates manufacturing investment in four African countries ± the Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe ± in which ®nancial markets have been heavily controlled. During the 1990s per capita GDP has declined in Africa generally at 1.8 percent p.a. whereas in other developing areas it has grown by 4.4 percent World Bank (1996) . There is some evidence from growth regressions (King and Levine (1993) and Easterly and Levine (1995) ) that ®nancial markets are important in the growth process and that their weakness in Africa has contributed to these outcomes. One route by which ®nancial markets might matter is through the level and ef®ciency of investment. To date, analyses of African investment have typically been based upon national aggregate investment rates, whether through time series of particular countries (for example Jenkins (1996) and Mlambo and Mhlophe (1995) ) or international cross-sections (for example, Kumar and Mlambo (1995) and Hadjimichael et al. (1995) ). Such datasets do not provide the information necessary to assess the links between ®nancial performance and ®rm investment.
A positive relationship between pro®tability and investment has been widely found in both developed and developing countries (Fazzari et al. (1988) , Hoshi et al. (1991) , Bond and Meghir (1994) , Tybout (1983) , Athey and Laumas (1994) and Harris et al. (1994) ). If ®rms have limited access to ®nancial markets pro®tability affects the capacity to ®nance investment. The more ®nancially constrained the ®rm the less able it is to adjust to its desired capital stock. Tybout (1983, p.600) argues that`if the effect of credit rationing is essentially to increase the user cost of capital, rationed ®rms should exhibit relatively high marginal products of capital in the long run, and they should be relatively sluggish in adjusting their capital stocks to any given gap between actual and desired levels'. In a¯exible accelerator speci®cation of the investment function the ability of the ®rm to respond to changes in its desired capital stock is re¯ected in the positive effect on investment of the growth in value-added. Past ®rm borrowing may affect present investment adversely if such borrowing increase the probability of bankruptcy. Firm size and age may affect investment for several reasons. Both size and age may affect access to ®nance and thus be associated with ®rm speci®c capital costs. Indivisibilities in investment, if investment rates are low, may imply a different pattern in the timing of investment for ®rms of different size. The importance of all these factors in determining investment in plant and equipment in African manufacturing ®rms is investigated in this paper in the context of major changes in macroeconomic policies in the countries surveyed.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the macroeconomic policy environments in the four countries. In Section III the data on which the results are based is described. Alterative speci®cations for the investment function are set out in Section IV and the estimation results presented in Section V. Section VI provides a comparative review of the ®ndings in this paper for Africa and those for other countries. Section VII concludes.
II. THE MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
All the countries included in this paper faced dif®culties in their macroeconomic environment that had important implications for the performance of the manufacturing sector. The periods convered by the RPED surveys, on which the analysis in this paper is based, were for Kenya 1992 , for Ghana 1991 to 1993 , for Zimbabwe 1992 and for Cameroon 1992 / 93 to 1994 . Figure 1 shows the pattern of the changes in real per capita GDP for the four countries from 1980 to 1995 and in Table 1 the trend growth rates are presented for the period from 1971 to 1995. Ghana has seen a sustained reversal of poor economic performance. However this recovery is in the context of the largest fall in real per capita GDP since 1971 of any of the four countries. Economic performance in Cameroon deteriorated dramatically in the period from the mid 1980s. Kenya is the only country which has seen a long term sustained growth of per capita income. In Zimbabwe per capita GDP has fallen at a trend rate of 0.4 percent per annum over the period from 1971. The shaded areas in the ®gure indicate the period for which the surveys were conducted. All the countries have adopted some measures of economic reform in the last decade. The structural adjustment programmes adopted by the Ghana government date from 1983. In the period from 1983 to 1991 the exchange rate had been liberalised so that, by the start of the survey period (1992), the premium on foreign exchange had been eliminated. In the late 1980s a reform of the ®nancial system had removed a substantial number of nonperforming loans from the banking system and had liberalised interest rates which were substantially positive in real terms over the survey period (see Table 2 below). There may have been a slow-down in growth in the years Source: IMF Financial Statistics (various issues). The nominal exchange rate (Er) is the period average of the domestic currency relative to the US dollar (line rf). The real exchange rate is de®ned as the domestic CPI de¯ated by the US export price index (XPus) adjusted by the nominal exchange rate (CPI/ Er Ã XPus). The nominal interest rate is the rate at which the monetary authorities lend or discount eligible paper for deposit money banks (line 60).
The real interest rate is simply the nominal rate less the rate of in¯ation.
covered by the survey but, as can be seen from Table 1 , the trend growth over the period 1983±94 was far higher than for any of the other countries. In Kenya the donors temporarily withdrew their support in 1991. This initiated a serious economic crisis and there were falls in per capita GDP from 1991 to 1993 (Figure 1 ). Political turmoil and ethnic clashes before and after the elections in December 1992 also had serious repercussions on the economy. There was considerable uncertainty about government policies. Thus 1993, which is the year at the centre of the survey period, was one of the worst years in post-independence Kenya. By mid 1994 there had been some economic recovery and the per capita growth rate for 1994 was positive for the ®rst time in four years ( Figure 1) .
In both Zimbabwe and Cameroon the period since 1983 has seen trend declines in their per capita GDP and, in the case of Zimbabwe this negative trend extends from the 1970s. Both countries adopted policies of substantial reform in the 1990s.
In Zimbabwe a structural adjustment programme was adopted in 1991. Policy changes initially focused on dismantling the highly restrictive system of import and foreign exchange controls. This involved substantial exchange rate adjustments, which quickly eliminated much of the parallel market premium, and the gradual movement of import categories to an Open General Import Licence (OGIL) list to which foreign exchange rationing did not apply. By the time of the ®rst survey (June 1993) these reforms had eliminated most of the trade and exchange rate problems which ®rms had faced throughout the 1980s. Zimbabwe was hit by a very serious drought in 1991/92, which still affected the surveyed manufacturing ®rms in 1993, in that demand was still low. It subsequently recovered quickly. In the course of the survey period (1993±95) there were two important changes. First, competition increased, both from new domestic ®rms and from imports. Second, the combination of ®ncancial liberalisation and a large ®scal de®cit led to sharp rises in nominal interest rates so that real interests rates changed from À13 percent in 1992 to 7 percent in 1994 and 1995 (Table 2) .
Cameroon experienced by far the largest fall in per capita GDP, of the four countries, in the period 1983 to 1994, Table 1 . Between 1986 and 1994 Cameroon's per capita income fell by nearly 50 percent, Figure 1 . An adverse terms of trade shock in 1986, and declines in government revenue, led to the ®nancing of the public de®cit with increased external borrowing and arrears in the private sector. In 1988, an IMF-supported stabilisation package was accepted by the government, followed a year later by the implementation of a World Bank and bilateral donor-®nanced Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Given the CFA zone's ®xed nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis the French franc, the government had to reply on policy instruments other than the exchange rate for adjustment. Despite some major reforms in the business environment (including price and labour deregulation, banking sector reform and tariff reductions), income continued to fall, with little export growth. In early 1994, the CFAF was devalued by 50 percent against the French franc, and measures of trade and indirect tax reform section were implemented. Since this latest round of reforms, some positive signals have been registered at the macroeconomic level, in particular the ®rst increase in per capita GDP since 1986, Figure 1 . Table 2 presents the rates of in¯ation, the rates of depreciation of the real exchange rate and real interest rates from 1991 to 1995 for all the countries in this study. While the largest nominal depreciation was in Ghana and the smallest in Cameroon, the largest real devaluation was in the Cameroon. All four countries have in common high, and highly variable, rates of in¯ation and exchange rate depreciation. In all four countries real interest rates, measured simply as the difference between nominal rates and the rate of in¯ation, have moved between substantial positive and negative numbers. The level of nominal interest rates has also been highly variable; in Kenya doubling, then halving, during the period of the surveys. It is clear that the macroeconomic environment in which the ®rms worked ensured the potential for substantial uncertainty. Uncertainty about the real interest rate they would face, uncertainty about the real exchange rate and uncertainty about the credibility of government policies to maintain incentives to export. It will be argued that such uncertainty plays a major role in explaining the poor investment performance of the ®rms.
III. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
The sample is drawn from a survey of ®rms in the manufacturing sectors of the Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe ranging in size from micro (less than ®ve employees) to those employing over a thousand. For each of the four countries three rounds of interviews were conducted over the period 1992 to 1995. The sample was chosen by sampling from four sectors within manufacturing ± textile and clothing, wood and furniture, metal working and machinery and foods ± and stratifying by size and location. In the regressions reported below we control for, but do not report, sector, ownership and location effects. The average size of ®rms in the samples is smallest in Ghana, at 36 employees, and largest in Zimbabwe at 303 employees. In Ghana and Zimbabwe the average size of ®rms increased over the survey period, although for Zimbabwe the rise was very small, Appendix A Table 1 . We wish to use lagged values of the variables, and to measure the growth rate of real value-added, so we lose one wave of the survey for each country. Initial inspection of the data led us to discard a few observations as being very sizable outliers leaving a sample size of 739 for which we have complete information. It is this sample which provides the basis of the regressions reported in this paper. Table 3 presents the averages of the variables we wish to explain across all three rounds of the survey and across the four countries. Investment refers to purchases of plant and equipment, investment in building and land is excluded from the analysis throughout this paper. Half the ®rms carry out no investment in any year. This problem also arose in the analysis of Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994, p. 43 ) who excluded all ®rms from their estimation which did not have four consecutive year of non-zero investments. It is clear from Table 3 that there is a pattern by which large ®rms, while more likely to invest, invest less than smaller ®rms when they do invest. The means of investments to capital of 9 percent are similar to those reported in studies for the UK (see Table 5 ). However such averages are misleading as can be seen by considering the distribution of the variables shown in Table 4 .
It is well known that rates of investment, in general, in African countries have been low. Table 4 shows just how low has been investment in the manufacturing sector. The median value for investment to value-added (IaV), and for investment to the capital stock (I/K), in the four countries is close to zero. The average pro®t rate (C/K) shown in Table 4 is very high. This is true for all the countries in the sample. It is also the case that this variable too has a highly asymmetric distribution in that the mean in 192 percent and the median is 38 percent. The asymmetry of the distribution of the variables implies that the median is a better measure than the mean of central tendency. Table 4 also shows a median value of the value-added to capital ratio (V/K) of 0.72. It is far higher for Ghana than for the other countries. Formal debts to the banking system (B/K) are negligible for the majority of ®rms and the data is wholly consistent with a severely ®nancially constrained regime operating in all the countries in the survey. Notes: Mi is the ith percentile, N is the number of observations. Variable de®nitions: IaK (À1) is investment in plant and equipment to the lagged capital stock, I/V is investment to value-added, C/K is the pro®t rate, V/K is value-added to capital, ÄV c aK (À1) is the change in real value-added de¯ated by lagged capital, K/V is the capital to value-added ratio and B/K is indebtedbess (de®ned as past formal borrowing) to capital.
Finally, the growth in value added at the median is negative at À3 percent per annum. Only in Ghana is the median growth rate positive. Table 5 provides comparative data for some European countries and India. Compared to all these countries the median values of investments to capital in all the African countries is low while the pro®t rate is high. In the literature the possibility that own ®nance is used to fund investment has been linked to the existence of ®nancial constraints and capital market segmentation.
The extent to which capital markets are segmented and how this segmentation can be modelled has been extensively investigated in the literature. Athey and Laumas (1994) use panel data on ®rms listed on the Indian stock exchange, summarised in Table 5 , and ®nd that net pro®ts were most important for larger ®rms where size is de®ned in terms of capital value. Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) have panel data for Indonesian ®rms, and they ®nd that small ®rms, de®ned in terms of employment (, 100 workers), appear to rely more on internal funds than larger ®rms. This is also the ®nding in Tybout (1983) . The speci®cations used in these papers are very close. A similar result, derived by a different route, can be found in Nabi (1989) who uses an endogenous switching model to show that ®rms excluded from the formal capital market rely more on pro®ts for investment. It is this implication that small ®rms are more likely to be ®nancially constrained that will be considered in the regressions reported below.
IV. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE INVESTMENT FUNCTION
In the analyses of investment discussed in the last section all the papers assume that the ®rm's objective is to maximise pro®ts. They differ in the speci®cation chosen, essentially choosing either a¯exible accelerator or Table  2 ). The source for the UK data from 1983±1986 is Bond and Meghir (1994) . The Indian data is taken from Athey and Laumas (1994) . Size for the Indian ®rms refers to a measure of market capitalization so is not directly comparable to the employment de®nition used in this, and other papers, to investigate the size issue.
proceeding by the use of an Euler equation. In empirical implementation the latter uses a more general cost of adjustment function than is implied by the¯exible accelerator model. The papers have in common a valuation function of the form:
Ð( X ) is the net revenue function, K t is the capital stock, L t is labour and I t is investment. The expectations operator E t [ X ] is conditional on information available at the start of period t.
The Euler equation approach is adopted by Bond and Meghir (1994) using UK data and by Jaramillo et al. (1996) for Ecuadorian ®rms. They write a net revenue function of the form:
where F (K, L) is the production function, w is the wage rate, r the discount rate used by the ®rm and G (I t , K t ) is the cost of adjusting the capital stock, p is the output price and p I is the price of capital goods. The Euler equation speci®ed in discrete time can be written as:
where ä is the depreciation rate and â t t1 1a(1 r t ) is the ®rms' discount factor.
This equation, when extended to allow for imperfect competition and the possibility of debt ®nancing of the ®rm, leads to an estimating equation of the form:
In this equation the term VaK controls for imperfect competition and is eliminated from the Euler equation under perfect competition; otherwise the coef®cient on the term is positive. The debt term in the equation (BaK) 2 controls for non-separability between investment and borrowing and is eliminated under Modigliani-Miller debt irrelevance.
The speci®cation in equation [3] specialises to the¯exible accelerator form if the cost function depends only on investment, it can be shown that
and that such a speci®cation leads directly to the accelerator model of investment
where K Ã is the desired capital stock.
This formulation of the¯exible accelerator model was originally due to Eisner and Strotz (1963) . If this model is extended to allow for liquidity constraints and the effects of past borrowing then the speci®cation is of the following form:
Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997) provide a comparison of the effects of functional form by using speci®cations based both on the Euler equation and the¯exible accelerator form for four European countries: Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. They note that the interpretation of cash¯ow or pro®t terms in equations like [7] is ambiguous.`Whilst a signi®cant cash¯ow effect could re¯ect the presence of ®nancial constraints on investment, it is also possible that such terms could be signi®cant in the absence of ®nancial constraints. In the presence of adjustment costs, for example, current investment depends not only on current but also on expected future changes in the desired stock of capital. It is possible that information on cash¯ow helps to forecast output, for example, in which case such information on cash¯ow would help to explain investment spending in such a reduced form model. ' (p.4) In the next section we report estimates based on both the accelerator and an Euler equation. We allow for the fact that many African manufacturing ®rms do not invest by means of a logit which allows us to test whether sample selectivity is affecting the size of the pro®t coef®cient in the accelerator speci®cation. The fact of zero investment may re¯ect either a wish to disinvest, analysed in Nickell (1978, pp.55ff) , or the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility in ensuring that delaying investment is optimal, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . The ®rms in our sample are small so allied to such effects may be the indivisibilities in investment that ensure that small ®rms invest less often than large ones.
In this paper we seek to go some way in disentangling these alternative explanations for zero investment by means of two variables which may in¯uence the costs of capital to the ®rm. The ®rst is the size of ®rm measured by its number of employees. If indivisibilities are important then larger ®rms will be more likely to invest. If the cost of capital is being proxied by the size of the ®rm, larger ®rms having more access to the formal capital market might be expected to face lower ®rm speci®c capital costs, then size should affect both the propensity to invest and the amount of investment undertaken. The second variable we consider is the age of the ®rm. Longer established ®rms could arguably be thought to have access to lower cost capital and greater experience. If age is proxying cost it should affect both the decision to invest and the amount of investment undertaken.
In the approaches to modelling investment summarised above it is assumed that the ®rm faces an exogenously given cost of capital, r and any difference in ®rm costs are allowed for by using a panel estimation method.
The general form of the equations which have been used in the literature can now be summarized:
where d t is a time dummy, ç i is an unobserved ®rm-speci®c effect and v it is an error term. Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997) provide a comparison of the effects of alternative functional forms by using both these equations on a common set of data. We will draw on their ®ndings in the comparison between the results for this paper and others in section VI below. The importance of the factors discussed above ± pro®tability, the growth of value-added, borrowing, ®rm size and age ± in the determination of investment is taken up in the next section. We present ®rst a levels speci®cation of the decision to invest and the amount of investment using the accelerator speci®cation in [10] which includes both a linear and nonlinear term in borrowing. We then adopt three speci®cations using ®xed effects to test the robustness of the pro®t term in the determination of investment. The ®rst of these speci®cations again adopts the¯exible accelerator. The second is based on the Euler speci®cation as in [11] , extended to include a linear term in borrowing to ensure comparability with the accelerator equation. The third speci®cation then adds the term in the growth of value-added to the speci®cation based on the Euler equation. Such a simple generalisation allows the data to choose the form of the adjustment. The length of the panel, three years, is short, and the problems of bias identi®ed by Nickell (1981) are likely to be serious so, in the case of the Euler equation and its generalisation, we use instruments. Our objective is to see if the ®ndings regarding the effects of pro®tability of investment are sensitive to the speci®cation chosen and how the size of the effect compares with other studies.
V. THE EVIDENCE
In this section we examine how far the alternative variables in the investment function can explain both the decision to invest and the amount of investment undertaken in the four countries. We begin with the levels speci®cation. In Table 6 column [1] a logit for the decision to invest is presented. The argument presented in the last section is that both ®rm size and ®rm age may in¯uence the decision to invest, insofar as they re¯ect indivisibilities, uncertainty and ®rm speci®c capital costs. All the variables, except the change in value-added enter the speci®cation with a lag. As Table 6 , column [1] shows both the size of ®rm and its age are highly signi®cant determinants of the decision whether to invest. Larger ®rms are much more likely to invest and older ®rms less likely. However neither of these factors determine the amount of investment. In terms of the discussion in the previous section these results suggest that it is indivisibilities and uncertainty, rather than the cost of capital to the ®rm, that are being proxied by these variables. The pro®t rate variable enters signi®cantly both the decision to invest and the amount of investment undertaken. There are signi®cant differences across the countries in the propensity to invest but, conditioned on investment, the country dummies are not signi®cant. Tables 7 to 9 report ®xed effects estimates where ®rm ®xed effects have been removed by differencing the variables. The dependent variable is the investment to capital ratio and the sample is con®ned to those ®rms which carried out some investment over the second and third rounds of the survey. 
Notes:
The ®gures in [] parentheses are the robust one-step t statistics reported in the DPD programme, Arellano and Bond (1988) . (a) The Wald test (1) is a test for the joint signi®cance of the two variables.
One is the growth of real value-added interacted with the log of size, the second is the pro®t rate interacted with the log of size. (b) The Wald test (2) is a test for the joint signi®cance of the pro®t term interacted with the country dummies. Ã indicates signi®cance at the 5% level, ÃÃ at the 1% level.
directly comparable with those of Table 6 columns [2] and [3] . Table 7 also presents the results separately for large and small ®rms. Firms are de®ned as large if their average number of employees over the three rounds of the survey was greater than 100. In Table 7 column [1] the coef®cient on the pro®t rate term is double in size that obtained in Table 6 column [3] while the coef®cient on the growth in real value-added is unchanged. The result for the pro®t term would seem to con®rm the importance of ®rm ®xed effects which are biasing down this coef®cient. In comparing the results for large and small ®rms, Table 7 columns [2] and [3] , both the pro®t term and the coef®cient on growth of value added become insigni®cantly different from zero for large ®rms. However in the case of the pro®t term the point estimates are very close. To test if there was a size effect on these coef®cients we interacted the log of the average employment size with both coef®cients. The result was that these interactive terms were not signi®-cantly different from zero. This suggests that for both these coef®cients there is no difference based on ®rm size. We also report a test for the pooling of the coef®cients on the pro®t term over the four countries, (Wald test (2) at the bottom of Table 7 ). There is no evidence for different pro®t effects across the four countries.
In Table 8 we report the results of the differenced estimator based on the Euler equation speci®cation, equation [11] above. In this speci®cation the interpretation of the V/K term arises from the possibility that the ®rms operate in non-competitive markets. In Table 8 it is not signi®cantly different from zero. The pro®t rate term is similar to that obtained for the accelerator speci®cation. In this equation we have instrumented the lagged dependent term and its square by the initial levels of the other variables in the equation. As for the accelerator speci®cation we also report tests for the null hypothesis that the pro®t coef®cient is the same across the four countries. For this speci®cation this hypothesis is rejected at the one percent signi®cance level.
Finally in Table 9 we present a general speci®cation which includes both the lag structure suggested by the Euler equation speci®cation and the growth rate of real value-added. One problem with the speci®cation presented in Table 6 is that this variable is clearly endogenous, so in this ®nal run we instrument it by its lagged value. The result of presenting this more general speci®cation is to increase the short-run pro®t coef®cient to 0.10 and now the hypothesis of pooling across countries is accepted, (Wald test (2) at the bottom of Table 9 ). The rejection of this hypothesis for the Euler speci®cation appears to be due to the speci®cation of the lags in that equation. As in Table 8 the point estimates for the pro®t coef®cient for large ®rms is negative and not signi®cantly different from zero in contrast to the well speci®ed results for small ®rms. However a test of interacting size with both the growth of value-added and pro®t, Wald test (1) at the bottom of Table 9 , shows that these effects across size are not signi®cant.
The speci®cation reported in Tables 6 and 7 is similar to that chosen by Tybout (1983) , Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) and Athey and Laumas (1994) while that reported in Table 8 is similar to that of Bond and Meghir (1994) and by Jaramillo et al. (1996) . The results reported show that similar effects to those observed in other datasets can be found in this African study. However it is not simply the existence of a pro®t effect that is of importance but its size, both across ®rms of different size and across countries. How the results reported in Tables 7 to 9 compare with other studies is shown in Table 10 and discussed in the next section. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
In section II the macroeconomic background of the countries used in the sample in this paper was presented. The country that has experienced the largest sustained rise in per capita income in the recent past is Ghana. This (1) is a test for the joint signi®cance of the two variables. One is the growth of real value-added interacted with the log size, the second is the pro®t rate interacted with the log of size. (d) The Wald test (2) is a test for the joint signi®cance of the pro®t term interacted with the country dummies. Ã indicates signi®cance at the 5% level, ÃÃ at the 1% level. (Table 7) 0.06 0.04 0.06 Euler equation (Table 8) 0.09 À0.03 0.09 General speci®cation (Table 9) 0.10 À0.02 0. (e) Small is ®rms with less than 100, large is ®rms with more than 100 employees. A ®ner division was tried identifying ®rms with from 20±100 employees separately but there was no difference between such ®rms and those employing less than 20.
may be an important factor in explaining the relative success of Ghana in the sample. Only in Ghana was the median growth in value added positive for the manufacturing sector. In Ghana the average size of ®rms, measured in terms of employment, increased by 15 percent over the three rounds of the survey, while it fell in the Cameroon and Kenya. The propensity for ®rms to invest in Ghana is also signi®cantly higher than in Kenya and Cameroon (see Table 6 ). While the relatively favourable macroeconomic environment in Ghana may have helped smaller ®rms to carry out some investment the gain was limited. In terms of median rates of investment Zimbabwe is, at 3.3 percent, far higher than any of the other countries. It is this very poor performance of the best performer which is indicative of the magnitude of the problems faced by ®rms in Africa's manufacturing sector. Why are these investment rates so low? A common factor across all the four African countries in our sample is a poor macroeconomic policy environment. High and variables rates of in¯ation, rapid and variable rates of exchange rate depreciation in the cases of Kenya, Ghana and Zimbabwe. A large devaluation in Cameroon that was widely anticipated and contentious as a policy option. In cross-section studies there is evidence that the quality of the macroeconomic environment is of importance for growth. The evidence presented here is indirect, but entirely consistent with this cross-section evidence. The most persuasive factor suggesting that high risk plays a very important part in the problems facing ®rms in Africa manufacturing sector is the very high pro®t rates shown across all the countries. It is important to stress these are average rates of return and marginal rates are likely to be much lower. The high rate of return required on investment in Africa suggests that the costs of capital, in terms of the ®rm speci®c discount rate required to justify investment, is very high. This micro ®nding is consistent with other evidence. Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma (1996) ®nd that the return on foreign investment in Africa over the period 1990 to 1994 is around 60 percent higher than in other developing countries, in the range of 24±30 percent, as against 16±18 percent. They also ®nd that these high returns do not generate high rates of investment: in 1995¯ows to Africa (excluding South Africa) were only US$2 billion, less than 2 percent of all¯ows to developing countries and less than half those to the next lowest region, the Middle East.
The most common reason advanced for low levels of investment, particularly among small ®rms, is that they are ®nancially constrained. We noted above that most studies have found that smaller ®rms respond more to pro®ts than do larger ®rms. It seems useful, as the average size of ®rms in the sample is so small, to compare the results for this study with others. Table 10 , which presents such a comparison, shows that the pro®t effect is much less for the ®rms in our sample than that found in most comparable studies. The pro®t coef®cient for all ®rms is below that found by Bond and Meghir (1994) and by Athey and Laumas (1994) . Considering small ®rms, where small is de®ned as those employing less than 100, the coef®cient in this study ranges from 0.06 for the accelerator speci®cation to 0.10 for the most general speci®cation. This compares with 0.429 in Tybout (1983) and 0.65 in Harris, Schiantarelli and Siregar (1994) . The paper by Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (1997) is particularly relevant as it compares the accelerator and Euler equation approaches on the same data. Their ®ndings are reproduced in the lower part of Table 10 . For all four of the European countries in their study the Euler equation approach produced a lower coef®cient on the pro®t term than the accelerator model. We ®nd that the Euler speci®cation provides a slightly higher estimate of the pro®t effect. For the accelerator speci®cation the coef®cient is far higher for the European countries than it is for the African countries.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The low levels of investment in sub-Saharan Africa have been widely recognised to be an important policy problem. In this paper ®rm-level evidence has been reported for investment in plant and equipment in the manufacturing sector for four countries: Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. The median rate of investment across the four countries is close to zero. These low investment rates are associated with high pro®t rates and low rates of growth of value-added.
The low rate of value-added growth from the micro data re¯ects the poor macroeconomic performances of the economics. Only Kenya has seen a long run, sustained per capita income growth over the last twenty years and that has been modest. All the countries have experienced high, and variable, rates of in¯ation and large changes in nominal and real interest, and exchange, rates. There is evidence from macroeconomic studies that such instability has adverse effects on growth and investment.
In order to understand the reasons for the low investment rates in the ®rms in the countries surveyed a model has been estimated of both the decision to invest and the amount of investment undertaken. In doing so we have been able to use the panel dimension of the data to allow for ®rm ®xed effects. The results reported in Tables 7 to 9 allow for ®rm ®xed effects and show a highly signi®cant positive pro®t effect onto investment for small ®rms, which is about twice the coef®cient found in the cross-section data. The most robust result to emerge from the ®xed effects estimates is that ®rm pro®ts play a signi®cant part in investment decisions and the coef®cient ranges for 0.06 to 0.10, depending on the speci®cation. In the most general speci®cation tested the hypothesis of a common coef®cient on the pro®t term across countries was accepted.
We have compared these results with those available for other countries. Where a direct comparison for small ®rms is possible the coef®cient found in this study is substantially lower than that in comparable studies. Research using data from European countries ®nds that a Euler equation approach produces a much smaller coef®cient on the pro®t term in investment equations than the use of the¯exible accelerator speci®cation. In this paper we ®nd for the African data that the two speci®cations produce similar identical results. The African data reported in this paper differ radically from all the comparable studies in the combination of very low levels of investment and high pro®t rates.
The conclusion we would draw is that, while the evidence is consistent with ®rms being ®nancially constrained, the most important factor adversely affecting investment is the high capital costs facing the ®rms which are re¯ected in their high pro®t rates. Macroeconomic studies report an adverse effect of instability on investment. The micro evidence presented here is entirely consistent with such ®ndings. Formal borrowing were identi®ed separately in the questionnaire and include borrowing from banks and other formal institutions.
Employment is de®ned to be the total number of employees in the ®rm. There is no distinction between casuals or part-time workers. The number of part time workers identi®ed in the surveys is small.
